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Abstract. With the COVID-19 pandemic, quarantines took place across
the globe. In the aim of stopping or slowing the progression of the
COVID-19 contamination, many countries have deployed a contact trac-
ing system to notify persons that be in contact with a COVID-positive
person. The contact tracing system is implemented in a mobile applica-
tion and leverages technologies such as Bluetooth to trace interactions
between persons. This paper discusses different smart-phone applications
based on contact tracing system from privacy point of view.
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1 Introduction
The globe is sick by the COVID-19 epidemic. Many countries are choosing nu-
meric solutions to help decreasing the virus propagation. They are implement-
ing and deploying mobile applications with a system for tracking contacts of
persons. Proposed applications leverage Bluetooth technology to trace interac-
tions between persons. The tracing system help the health authorities in these
countries to decrease the number of contaminated persons. If a person is tested
COVID-positive, it will be possible with such an application to alert all the per-
sons that have been in physical or close contact with the infected person the
previous days.
Contact tracing is the process of identifying and monitoring which persons
had contact with infectious persons. This is possible by leveraging our smart-
phones. The smart-phone of a user broadcasts its identifier which is recorded by
nearby smart-phones of crossed persons. If a user tests positive for the COVID-
19, the list of recorded identifiers by that user is used to notify crossed persons
that they were in close range from an infected person. The notified persons
are invited to do varying courses of actions including self-quarantine, symptom
watch and testing [4].
Contact tracing systems use Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) technology which
was first specified in 2010. The BLE has become the dominant low-power wireless
technology in a variety of consumer electronics devices, including the smart-
phones. In fact, smart-phones bring widespread presence to BLE. The energy-
efficiency of the BLE allows its use in contact tracing systems. To note that,
2 M-L. Messai et al.
other smart-phone application solutions for COVID-19 pandemic based on the
use of GPS are developed such as Mapy.cz in Czech and the contact tracing
application from Iran [5]. It is proposed to the users to archive the GPS data of
their movements and to share it with the health investigators if necessary [2].
The use of GPS makes the application a battery-intensive solution and it does
not work well indoors.
In this paper, we discuss the privacy issues with contact-tracing apps– we set
out for a privacy comparison of the most relevant contact tracing applications.
We first discuss the privacy consideration in Section 2. Then, we describe briefly
each of the contact tracing application in Section 3 and compare them according
to their privacy property in Section 4. In Section 5, we conclude the paper.
2 Privacy Consideration
The privacy is a state in which one is not observed or disturbed by other persons.
A contact tracing application is a mobile phone application which records, using
Bluetooth, contacts between persons, in order to detect a possible risk of infec-
tion. We remark that there is a risk for privacy violation which can be mitigated
more or less well, but not completely, depending on the approach taken in the
application design such as anonymization technique [6,7].
2.1 Privacy threat sources
In a country, the health authority is assumed to offer the medical tests if a
person is infected or not. The health authority, without respecting the privacy
of citizens, can try to deanonymize users’ IDs to trace possible new infections.
It can also try to use collected data to identify contacts of persons in other kind
of applications. Another source of threat is a malicious application developer
which could add a snooping module on data from other applications on the
smart-phone or requesting permissions which may result in surveillance of the
user. Other kinds of malicious actions might be supposed. Infected users are also
a source of threat. It can try to spread panic by wandering around to distort
the application or set IDs as past contacts, even though they have not met. This
could lead into error the corresponding users. The last source of threat is the
hacker who accesses the user’s smart-phone or the server that store the collected
contact tracing data. The attacker can analyze these data or sell them to third
parties.
3 Contact tracing applications
In the aim to break infection chains, several mobile applications are developed
supporting contact tracing. In this section, the most relevant applications are
described.
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Singapore was one of the first nations to adopt a Bluetooth-powered contact-
tracing application, fueling plenty of global debate about the best way to de-
ploy the technology. The application is called TraceTogether [3]. TraceTogether
is an application that can be downloaded voluntarily and facilitates the con-
tact tracing process. With your consent, it exchanges Bluetooth signals with
nearby smart-phones running the same application. When a person sign up on
the TraceTogether, a random User ID is generated and associated with your
mobile number. Both the mobile number and User ID are stored in a secure
server, and never shown to the public [3]. AC19 is the Iranian application. It
requires a user to register using their mobile number. It uses unencrypted GPS
data for contact tracing. While Asian countries had notable success using mo-
bile applications for tracing infections, these applications are highly invasive with
respect to the user’s privacy [5]. For instance, India is the only democracy mak-
ing its application called Aarogya Setu mandatory for millions of people. As a
consequence, a considerable effort must be done to present privacy preserving
tracing applications. In Europe, several variants of applications are proposed
based on the PEPP-PT (Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing)
framework. The French application is called StopCovid. The German one is NTK
as described in [1]. They are closely related and thus have very similar privacy
properties. In Austria, Stopp Corona is the proposed application and it is also
based on the PEPP-PT framework. Another interesting collaboration effort is
the Private Automated Contact Tracing (PACT), led by MIT researchers. In
USA, different contact tracing applications have emerged recently. One of these
application is Covid-Watch based on the use of Bluetooth. When a user is in-
fected then the list of anonymous contact numbers in his smart-phone is publicly
made available with her consent. Other users then use this public list to find out
whether they came in close contact of an infected person or not. Decentralized
Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (DP-3T) is an open source application
listed as one of several privacy-preserving decentralized approaches to contact
tracing. Other countries are also developing their own contact tracing applica-
tion. Generally, the application uses GPS based location tracking, Bluetooth or
a combination of them for collecting information.
4 Comparison
The following table presents a comparison of contact tracing applications de-
scribed previously regarding the sources of privacy threat defined in Section
2. A unique identification number is randomly generated in the majority of dis-
cussed applications to ensure anonymity and it is used for tracing all the contacts
in close proximity of users. An unavoidable privacy loss of all application in the
scenario where a user has only contact with one other user, then the user can
learn whether the other person is infected based on whether she/he receives a
COVID-19 notification.
No matter how smart-phone contact tracing applications might be helpful to
break infection chains, it still come with privacy concerns. Whether the smart-
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Table 1. Tracing contact applications comparison.
Apps Used technology Need trust server False claims for users Anonymization Malicious developer Data destruction
Aarogya Setu BLE and GPS Yes Yes No Not open source Yes
TraceTogether BLE Yes Yes Yes Open source Yes
Covid-Watch BLE No Yes Yes Not open source N.C.
Stopp Corona BLE and GPS No Yes Yes Open source Yes
AC19 GPS Yes Yes No Not open source N.C.
PACT BLE No Yes Yes Not open source N.C.
StopCovid BLE Yes Yes Yes Open source Yes
phone application is base on GPS or Bluetooth, it is plenty accurate to invade
privacy and reveal your personal information [1]. Applications that need a trust
server are the applications based on the centralized approach where the server
determines who has been exposed to COVID-19. The drawback of a centralized
approach is that the server is the single point of failure. Applications that do
not need a trust server are the applications based on the decentralized approach.
Data destruction determines even collected personal data are deleted after a
period of time (N.C. for Not Communicated).
5 Conclusion and future work
Across the globe, scientists and researchers of the fields of information technol-
ogy are working to develop contact tracing applications to outbreak COVID-19
pandemic. A special care must be taken for security and privacy. Furthermore,
some scientists urge that the health benefits of deploying mobile applications
with system tracing need to be analyzed. In this poster, we present a prelimi-
nary comparison study of privacy-preserving contact tracing mobile applications
for COVID-19. Contact tracking is a very central topic in this moment. As a fu-
ture work, we plane to analyse the privacy issue in terms of data acquisition,
transmission and storage.
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